



## On Race Vulnerabilities in Web Applications

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DIMVA 2008

## Web applications


- many applications adopt the web paradigm: client-server model + HTTP protocol
- web servers are augmented with modules for the execution of server-side code

## Security issues

- web applications are known to be subject to different attacks (e.g., SQLI, XSS, command injection)
- ~ 60% of software vulnerabilities are specific to web applications


# Web application framework

## Single request




# Web application framework

Multiple parallel requests



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# Concurrency in web applications

- web apps are made of different scripts that perform well-defined, *sequential* tasks
- scripts usually access some shared resources (e.g., a database)
- multiple script instances can be executed concurrently
- race conditions are well known, but their impact on web applications has not been investigated

## Problem

*web programmers do not conceive their applications as multi-threaded or multi-process entities*

- unexpected parallelism can lead to unforeseen interactions
- parallelism can be controlled client-side
- synchronization primitives are seldom used, and their efficacy is often system-dependent

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# Motivating example

```
1 $res = mysql_query("SELECT credit FROM Users WHERE id=$id");
2 $row = mysql_fetch_assoc($res);
3 if($row['credit'] >= 800) {
4     <execute the requested operation>
5     $new_credit = $row['credit'] - 800;
6     $res = mysql_query("UPDATE Users SET credit=$new_credit" .
                          "WHERE id=$id");
}
```

$P_1$		$P_2$	
Line	Data	Line	Data

Database	
ID	Credit
50	2500
92	820
<b>123</b>	<b>1000</b>
205	1200
...	...



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## Case studies

- tested several open-source apps
- 2 real-world closed-source SMS<sup>a</sup> applications, both found to be vulnerable (. . . without having access to their source code!)

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<sup>a</sup>Text messages for mobile phones.

## How to dynamically spot race conditions?

- we focus on LAMP applications
- interactions between multiple instances of the *same* script
- limited to races on database accesses

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
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# How to spot race conditions?

## Framework overview



# Off-line analysis

## Candidate race conditions

### Idea

- monitor application's SQL queries
- *interdependent* queries could lead to race conditions

### Off-line analysis algorithm

- logged queries:  $Q = \langle q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n \rangle$
- $\forall q \in Q$  compute schema objects in  $\text{use}(q)$  and  $\text{def}(q)$
- *candidate* races are
$$(q_i, q_j) \in Q^2 : i < j \wedge \text{use}(q_i) \cap \text{def}(q_j) \neq \emptyset$$


A simple example:


Query<sub>1</sub>

```
SELECT id, credit  
FROM Users  
WHERE id = 123;
```

Query<sub>2</sub>

```
UPDATE Users  
SET credit = 100  
WHERE id = 123;
```

 = used

 = defined

disjoint WHERE clauses can lead to false positives:

*Query<sub>1</sub>*

```
SELECT id
FROM Sessions
WHERE expiry_time <= 123;
```

*Query<sub>2</sub>*

```
DELETE
FROM Sessions
WHERE expiry_time > 123;
```

## Solutions

- dynamically query the DB for a conjunction of WHERE clauses (→ efficient, but *not* sound)
- constraint solver (→ sound, but expensive and does not support all SQL constructs)

## Attribute-relation bindings

- it is not always apparent to which relation an attribute belongs (e.g., **SELECT**  $a_1, a_2$  **FROM**  $T_1, T_2$ )
- $\Rightarrow$  actively query the application database

## Annotations

- synchronization attempts can lead to false positives
- $\Rightarrow$  annotations to avoid reporting a race between a pair of SQL queries

Application	Category	Queries	FP	TP
Joomla! 1.5RC4	CMS	4086	0	55 (2)
phpBB 3.0.0	forum	2236	0	35 (4)
WordPress 2.3.2	blog/CMS	3638	0	47 (4)
Zen Cart 1.3.8a	shopping cart	35194	0	46 (1)

## What kind of vulnerabilities did we find?

Highly application-dependent. Some examples:

- bypass brute force checks
- vote multiple times with parallel vote requests
- circumvent anti-flooding features

## Dynamic, database-level analysis

- analysis is completely dynamic
- we only take into account database queries

## Lack of support for synchronization primitives

Why?

- during evaluation, we found really *few* synchronization attempts!
- lack of a set of “standard” synchronization primitives
- future work ;-)

## Contributions

- study of the impact of race conditions on web applications
- novel detection technique
- working experimental prototype for LAMP applications

## Future work

- consider interactions between different scripts
- employ program analysis techniques to extract more information about the application's logic
- take into account synchronization primitives

Thanks for the attention!



Questions?